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Introduction
Metals and minerals have (re-) gained lively interest by policy makers, scientists, and the public in recent years. This interest has a diverse background. Prices of many metals have increased strongly after 2003 and growing protectionism has caused concerns about the security of supply with raw materials, both in the US and the EU (U.S. Department of Energy, 2011; EU Commission, 2010) . Considerable environmental burdens from mining (Dudka and Adriano, 1997) and the perception that humanity over-exploits natural resources gave rise to the notion that resources need to be used more efficiently (EU Commission, 2011) . Quantitative economic analyses of these topics necessitate a tailored modeling framework. The first aim of this study is to provide such a framework for metals.
Its second aim is to calibrate the model on Rare Earth Elements. Rare Earths are a group of 17 metals indispensable in a diverse number of high tech applications including catalysts for fuel cracking, high performance permanent magnets, and phosphors in TV screens. Rare Earths are the most notorious example of the debate on security of supply with raw materials. The US, the EU, and Japan are dependent on Rare Earth imports from China, which heavily restricts their exports. A number of non-Chinese mining firms currently attempt to enter the market. Analyses of the dynamics on Rare Earth markets necessitate considering endogenous investment and a firm-level replication of the mining sector. Thus, Rare Earths are an excellent first subject of study for the model presented in this paper.
The model is closely related to three streams of economic literature. Firstly, to econometric investigations of metal markets. Aggregate behavioral equations for supply, demand, price formation, and recycling are proposed in these studies. Parameters of the equations are estimated using historical data. They can be interpreted, tested statistically and counterfactual analyses can be conducted. Examples include Fisher et al. (1972) ; Fisher and Owen (1981) ; Slade (1980) and, more recently, Agostini (2006) . The second literature stream calibrates partial equilibrium models on metal markets. Lanz et al. (2013) can serve as an example. They analyze the global copper market taking into account transportation costs, recycling and a disaggregated processing sector to assess the effects of sub-global climate policy on carbon leakage in the copper industry. Winters (1995) as well as Demailly and Quirion (2008) employ calibrated models to the steel sector. The third literature stream with which the METRO model shares similarities is energy system models allowing for a disaggregate representation of electricity generation (E3Mlab, 2010) .
The paper extends the literature in two directions. It presents the METal ResOurces (METRO) model, a dynamic partial equilibrium model developed to analyze metals and their markets. It depicts the life cycle of a metal beginning with resources in the ground and their extraction, over processing, fabrication of final products to recycling or disposal.
The mining sector consists of individual mines which invest endogenously in capacities.
This modeling framework has, to my knowledge, never been applied to metal markets.
Secondly, a new dataset on Rare Earths is compiled to calibrate the model.
The model is applied to simulate developments of supply, demand, and prices on Rare Earth markets. Simulations reveal that non-Chinese mining capacities will grow substantially until 2020. Rare Earth prices are expected to fall from 2016 onwards. Price differences between China and the rest of the world are considerably larger and more persistent for Heavy than for Light Rare Earths. They are not expected to fall below 10% before 2019 for Heavy Rare Earths. Comprehensive sensitivity checks indicate that these results are robust.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives an overview on Rare Earths and their markets. The theoretical setup of the METRO model is presented in section 3. Section 4 discusses the data used to calibrate the model. Model results are shown in section 5.
Outcomes of sensitivity analyses are presented in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Rare Earth Elements: Their Properties, their Markets,
Applications
Rare Earths are a collective term for a group of 17 metals. The Lanthanides, the elements ranging from Lanthanum (Number 57 in the periodic table of elements) to Lutetium (71), as well as Scandium (21) and Yttrium (39). They are often divided into two subgroups, the Light Rare Earths and the Heavy Rare Earths. The former include the Elements from Lanthanum (57) to Samarium (62), while the latter consist of Europium (63) to Lutetium (71). Yttrium is included in the Heavy Rare Earths due to its greater similarity to them.
All Rare Earths share similar chemical properties, which makes separating them challenging from a technical point of view and costly from an economic one. Their similarity is also the reason why they usually occur together in deposits, to a varying degree however. Unlike what their name suggests, Rare Earths are not rare from a geological point of view. The most abundant Rare Earth, Cerium, is roughly as abundant in the Earth's crust as copper. Even the rarest stable Rare Earth, Lutetium, is more abundant than Gold or Platinum. Rare Earths attain their rarity from the fact that they rarely occur in concentrations big enough to make their extraction profitable. Light Rare Earths are more abundant than Heavy Rare Earths, however.
Currently, China supplies the lion's share of Rare Earths. In 2001, it accounted for about 97% of the world production (U.S. Geological Survey, 2012b). This was not always the case. From the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, the Mountain Pass mine in California has been the most important source of Rare Earths worldwide. China entered the market in the late 1970s when commencing extraction of Rare Earths from the Bayan Obo mine in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, where they are won as a by-product of iron ore mining. Other important mining areas for Rare Earths are found in Sichuan and in the southern provinces of Fujian, Guangdong and Jiangxi (Tse, 2011) . China has further increased its output of Rare Earths over time, eventually forcing foreign competitors to exit the market (Hurst, 2010) . While current production of Rare Earths is highly concentrated in China, reserves are distributed much more widely. U.S. Geological Survey (2012b) estimates total reserves of Rare Earths at 110 million metric tons, only 48% of which are located in China. The
Chinese government estimates its share of reserves to be much smaller, at approximately 23% (SCIO, 2012) . Important deposits are found in the Commonwealth of Independent
States, the US, India, or Australia. By the end of July 2013, 52 projects outside China were at least at the stage where they had estimated their resources by international standards (Hatch, 2013b) . This indicates a potentially much more dispersed supply in the future.
Rare Earths serve as an important input for a multiplicity of different products. U.S. (Tse, 2011) . Quotas remained almost unaltered in 2013 (Hatch, 2013a) .
The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) allocates export licenses. China is accused of using the licensing system to enforce minimum export prices (WTO, 2012) . A significant share of Rare Earths exported was smuggled out of China (Hurst, 2010) , the quantities exported illegally appear to decline, however (Wübbeke, 2013) . I exclude the only Rare Earth without stable isotopes, Promethium, from the analysis as it occurs only in trace amounts. Scandium as well as Holmium to Lutetium are also excluded due to a lack of data.
Mining Sector
Let us assume that the mining sector in region r consists of a finite number of small, profitmaximizing mining companies (mn) each of which decides on its investment in capacities Mine mn maximizes its profits over all years t ∈ T = {2014, ..., 2025} according to equation (1). They take Rare Earth prices pMN reo r,t as given, reflecting that new Rare Earth mines will be run by small junior mining companies unable to gain market power in the short run.
Mining firms are assumed to have perfect foresight. Equation (1) implies that mines do not engage in intertemporal arbitrage by stockpiling. They do not extract Rare Earths and store them above the ground anticipating future price increases. This is a slight contradiction to the assumption of perfect foresight. As will turn out in the numerical results later, falling Rare Earths prices over much of T limit the incentive to stockpile and thus the importance of this assumption. δ is the discount factor which is assumed to be 7% for all mines.
The mines have to comply with two restrictions. Firstly, a mine must not extract more than the known exogenous resource stock R mn . This strict approach of restricting extraction resembles Hotelling (1931) . Allowing for endogenous investment in exploring and developing further deposits would increase the validity of the model's results (Adelman, 1990) . Neglecting endogenous increases in resource stocks does not bias the model's results, however, due to the large size of deposits already considered in the database for Rare Earths and the mid-term perspective of the simulations.
Secondly, physical capacities limit the extraction in each year t. Equation (3) specifies the capacity constraint. The initial capacity is denoted cap0 mn . Opening up a Rare Earth mine can take ten years and more. This is reflected by the mine-specific lag between the investment and the commencement of production lagInv mn . Ramping up a mine to full capacity takes some time as well. Therefore, capacity is reduced by 50% in the first year in which investment comes into effect.
Mines maximize their profits according to equation (1) for production to take place.
The shadow price of the resources constraint is determined by equation (5).
Equation (6) is the shadow price of the capacity constraint.
The investment cost function cInv mn remains to be specified. Partial equilibrium models applied on metal markets so far were static. The theoretical literature indicates, however, that capacity constraints and investment costs are important for modeling the behavior of extractive sectors correctly (Hartwick et al., 1985; Cairns, 2001; Holland, 2003) . That is certainly the case for a dynamic sector such as Rare Earth mining.
Some determinants of mine capacities can not be depicted explicitly in the model.
These include in particular capital constrains for highly risky investments such as Rare Earths' mining. Therefore, I chose a form-follows-function approach by defining an investment costs function that reliably yields realistic investment behavior and capacities.
The investment cost function has to replicate the following stylized facts. 1) Marginal costs if increasing capacity must be greater than zero already at zero capacity to avoid unrealistically small investments. 2) cInv mn has to be convex to prevent unrealistically large capacities. 3) Today's investment has to increase investment costs in the future
Otherwise, mines could spread investment and increase their capacities in small steps to circumvent the convexity of investment costs. Such investment behavior would be unrealistic, however. 4) If capacities equal those announced by the mining company, investment costs should match the announced ones.
The investment cost function (7) is used in the METRO model.cInv mn andcap mn denote capacities and corresponding investment costs announced by the mining firm. cap0 mn is the initial capacity of mine mn in 2013. ξ and ϕ are parameters used to calibrate the investment costs. As can be easily verified, the investment cost function (7) fulfills all four criteria.
The first term within the square brackets in equation (7) is the constant marginal cost part. The second term is convex (ϕ > 1). It is increasing in investment in all tt ≤ t. The parameter ξ denotes the weighting between the linear and the convex part. ϕ determines the degree of convexity.
Equation (8) characterizes the zero profit conditions with respect to investment. The gains from relaxing the capacity constraint have to outweigh the marginal costs of investment. Mines have to take into account the effects of investing in t on costs in tt > t.
Building up capacities today makes it more costly to further expand them in the future (equation 10). Transport costs are neglected, but could be implemented for metals with a lower valueto-weight ratio for which they are more important (Lanz et al., 2013) . Prices for recycled Rare Earths are pRec reo r,t .
Trade firms maximize their profits according to equation (11). They do not invest in capacities or stockpile metals. Therefore, profits can be maximized separately in each year t. ζ(mn, s) is a boolean parameter which is true if mine mn is located in region s. 
Maximizing the trading firms' profits yields the zero profit conditions determining inputs of primary and secondary raw materials. Equation (14) characterizes the first order conditions for inputs from all mines which are not subject to Chinese export quotas. That is inputs from all mines outside China and inputs from domestic mines.
Equation (15) 
Equation (16) 
The amount of recycled Rare Earths must not exceed the quantities available for recycling.
Equation (21) 
Market Clearing Conditions
Price levels are determined by the market clearing conditions. In its application for Rare
Earths, the METRO model has three types of prices to be determined. The producer price at the mines pMN reo r,t , the purchasers price faced by demand sectors pD Equation (24) shows the market clearing condition for the mines. The left-hand side of the inequality is the output of Rare Earth mn all mines in region r. The right-hand side is the demand by trading firms in all regions s for reo in region r. Chinese mines are aggregated into one firm which is assumed to produce an exogenous quantity of Rare Earths every year t. This reflects the fact that the Chinese government exhibits tight control over its domestic Rare Earths production and that it pursues goals beyond mere profit maximization. Recently announced plans to create a more concentrated mining sector with greater state influence (SCIO, 2012) and studies emphasizing China's diverse policy goals (Wübbeke, 2013; Pothen and Fink, 2013 ) confirm this assumption.
A number of small fringe producers in Brazil, India and Malaysia were active before 2012 (U.S. Geological Survey, 2012b). These firms are aggregated into one mine. Their output is assumed to remain constant. estimates, and some market prospective (Rudenno, 2009 ). Usually, multiple feasibility studies are compiled until a mine commences production, with an increasing degree of reliability. Reviews of feasibility studies indicate that they tend to estimate costs and opening dates optimistically (Mackenzie and Cusworth, 2007; Noort and Adams, 2006) . This is, however, a problem common to large scale construction projects in general (e.g.
Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006).
All data is derived from feasibility studies published no later than the 31st of July 2012. If more than one feasibility study is available, the most recent one is used. If more than one mine plan is available, the one recommended by the firm is used. If multiple resource estimates are presented, the one underlying the mine plan is used, if Planned capacities range from 4,000 tpa to 40,000 tpa REO with an average of about 13,000 tpa. Investment costs in Rare Earth mining are high, even by the standards of the mining sector. Costs range from 20,000 to almost 300,000 US$ per ton of capacity.
Processing facilities usually make up for a large share of investment costs. Extraction costs also vary strongly, from about 3 US$ to 70 US$ per kg of Rare Earth Oxides. Cost data in table 2 has to be interpreted with care, however. Costs of extracting and processing by-products are allocated to Rare Earth extraction. This overestimates the costs for mines planning to sell by-products as well.
Mines in the dataset exhibit considerable variation with respect to the year in which they plan to commence production. Figure 5 presents the number of mines which an-3 Greenland is neither member of the EU, nor of the OECD. The investment cost function is parameterized by assuming ξ = 0.4 and ϕ = 10. In the baseline simulations, the difference between proposed capacities and those projected by the model is 11.7% which can be considered sufficiently realistic. Sensitivity checks reveal that results are robust to variations in ξ and ϕ.
Demand
Demand for Rare Earths is calibrated according to prognoses by Kingsnorth (2012) (2012) ones of -0.3. Gupta (1982) finds large variation in the demand price elasticity for Zinc.
The numbers vary between -0.005 and -0.78. In their model of steel sectors, Demailly and
Quirion (2008) and Gielen and Moriguchi (2002) assume demand elasticities of -0.3 and -0.2, respectively. Here, the price elasticity of demand is assumed to be t = −0.3 for all applications in the model. Elasticities increase to a value of t = −0.5 in 2020 to account for growing flexibility in the long run.
Prices and Trade Restrictions
All prices for Rare Earths are based on data from asianmetal.com. Domestic prices for China and foreign prices (FOB China) are available for most Rare Earth Oxides. The arithmetic mean of daily data is used to compute annual averages.
Chinese export tariffs for Rare Earths are taken from Tse (2011) . Data on recent export quotas is available in Hatch (2012b Hatch ( , 2013a . Note that setting export restrictions according to the official Chinese numbers found in Hatch (2012b Hatch ( , 2013a assumes no smuggling of Rare Earths to take place in the future. This reflects both the increasing efforts of the Chinese government to put a kybosh on illegal exports and the lack of data about the costs of smuggling.
5 Simulation Results
Baseline
The METRO model is applied to assess key developments of supply, demand, and prices of Rare Earths until 2020. This section presents the results based on the following assumptions. Export quotas and tariffs remain unchanged at the levels of 2013. Due to a lack of data, export barriers implied by the allocation of export licenses and illegal exports are not considered in the model. Chinese production is assumed to be exogenously determined and increases to 150,000 tons in 2018. Recycling costs are prohibitive. Two conclusions can be drawn from these results. Firstly, introducing recycling has the most significant effects if it takes place in the short run. The additional supply affects market prices strongly while investment lags constraint the entry of non-Chinese mines.
Secondly, assuming constant marginal costs of recycling can lead to large and quick shifts in recycling rates. Therefore, results derived under this assumption need to be interpreted carefully.
Sensitivity Checks
Using a dynamic partial equilibrium model to analyze metal markets is a novel approach.
Applying such a model on Rare Earths is novel as well. Comprehensive sensitivity analyses are important to assess the robustness of the results. Therefore, a number of Monte Carlo Simulations are conducted. The sensitivity of the results with respect to the following parameters is investigated: the price elasticity of demand t , the demand prognoses ∆ reo,app r,t , the parameters quantifying the investment cost function ξ and ϕ, and the cost datacInv mn and c mn .
Except forcInv mn and c mn , which are analyzed jointly, each of the parameters is assessed in an individual Monte Carlo Simulation. A triangular-distributed random variable X with a lower limit of 0.75, an upper limit of 1.25, and mode of 1 is used in the simulations. For ξ and ϕ, the lower limit is decreased to 0.5 and the upper limit raised to shows some sensitivity to demand shocks. The confidence interval is around 55% of δpD t in the status-quo from 2016 to 2020. Take 2016 as an example. The 95% confidence interval of δpD 2016 is [23.5,43.8] , the status quo value is 37.0. The width of the confidence interval (20.3) corresponds to 55% of the status-quo value. The sensitivity to demand shocks is not a surprising result. Positive demand shocks make export restrictions more effective, negative shocks make them less binding and reduce the necessity for new investment.
Thus, the sensitivity to demand shocks reflects characteristics of the market rather than flaws of the model. Figure 12 (c) and (d) display the sensitivity of δpD t to changes in the two parameters of the investment cost function ξ and ϕ. Recall that the upper limit is larger than in the other Monte Carlo Simulations (1.5 compared to 1.25) and the lower limit is smaller (0.5 compared to 0.75). Nevertheless, price differences are insensitive to the assumptions on ξ and ϕ.
The confidence interval for δpD t in the simulation for investment and extraction costs is shown in figure 12 (e). As in all Monte Carlo Simulations, the model's results remain qualitatively unchanged. Sensitivity of the results can be observed mostly between 2016 and 2018, when expansion of non-Chinese capacity is particularly strongly. The 95% confidence intervals are [31.4,50.3] in 2016, [19.7,26.8] in 2017 and [8.3,14.8] 
in 2017.
These results also reflect uncertainties about costs estimates underlying the calibration.
Conclusions
This paper presents the METal ResOurce (METRO) model, a novel dynamic partial equilibrium model which can be used to depict a large number of metal markets. It covers the whole physical life cycle of a metal, from extraction to recycling or disposal. It is, to my knowledge, the first partial equilibrium model for metal markets with endogenous investment in mining capacities. The first application of the METRO model are the markets for Rare Earth Elements. Therefore, a novel dataset on Rare Earth mines was compiled to calibrate the model. The METRO model allows for extension in several directions. Non-Chinese mines are assumed to be price takers. If a small number of new firms is able to enter the market and face an inelastic demand, they might be able to exert market power. Thus, the model could be extended by allowing for strategic behavior. 5 Introducing trade costs can emphasize the spatial dimension of the model. The METRO model can also be extended by introducing technical progress, which is not negligible in the long run (Aydin and Tilton, 2000; Garcia et al., 2001) . Not least, the model can be calibrated to a large number of other metals.
